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JOHN C. CALHOUN ON THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE
JOHN R. VILE*
One of the most elusive provisions of the United States
Constitution is the clause found in article IV, section 4, which
guarantees each state a "Republican Form of Government."1 In
light of the many concepts associated with the notion of republi-
canism, this clause potentially could have become one of the
most important in the Constitution.' Arguably, it is capable of
reaching issues that courts in this century have tackled only
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 In the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court
gave the guarantee clause a restrictive reading from which it has
never emerged.4
* Professor of Political Science and Head, Department of Social Sciences,
McNeese State University, Lake Charles, Louisiana. B.A., College of William and Mary;
Ph.D., University of Virginia.
1. The complete section reads: "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened) against domestic violence." U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
2. One prominent expositor of the clause associates it with the prohibition of "re-
gression to monarchical and aristocratic government" as well as to "the principles of
popular sovereignty, representative government, majority rule, separation of powers, and
federal supremacy." See Wiecek, Guarantee Clause, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 874 (L. Levy ed. 1986).
3. Commentators have argued that the clause might have served as an alternative
to the equal protection clause as a means of correcting state legislative malapportion-
ment. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 118 n.* (1980); see also Bork, Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1, 19 (1971) (discussing use
of the equal protection clause in addressing legislative malapportionment).
In this context, one commentator has argued that the equal protection clause has
had the effect of "stunting potentially broad constitutional development of the guarantee
clause." See Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecution of State
and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367 (1989).
4. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see also Pacific States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (following reasoning of earlier cases). These cases
primarily restricted the judicial role in relation to the guarantee clause. Cf. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The high point of congressional activity under the guarantee
clause came during the early years of Reconstruction, but Congress has exercised little
such power since. See W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
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Because of contemporary disagreements over that decision
and the meaning of republican government, a wide range of
views exists today regarding the appropriate interpretation of
the clause. In addition to suggesting that the clause might be an
alternate means of correcting state legislative malapportion-
ment,5 commentators have viewed the clause as a way to: invali-
date racially discriminatory initiatives;6 remedy defects in state
governmental structures that result in the violation of individual
rights;7 and guarantee that states adhere to their own constitu-
tions and laws."
One author has suggested that judicial review under the
guarantee clause is a proper means to "limit state delegation of
legislative power, place some constraints on initiatives and refer-
enda, and subject state regulation to meaningful rationality re-
view."' Another writer, arguing that the clause should be viewed
primarily as a guarantee of state autonomy, has suggested more
specifically that the clause should allow states to "have discre-
tion to define their own franchises; to choose their own govern-
mental structures; to set qualifications and salaries for officials
performing legislative, executive, or judicial tasks; and to oper-
ate their governments as autonomous units rather than as
branch offices of the federal government" as long as they do not
violate other constitutional -provisions.' 0 Yet another scholar,
writing in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in McNally
v. United States," has suggested that the guarantee clause
might be an effective basis for congressional legislation authoriz-
116-209 (1972). Most, if not all, presidential actions that could have been justified by
reference to the latter part of the guarantee section have been accompanied by other
justifications. See Ferguson, The Inherent Justiciability of the Constitutional Guaranty
Against Domestic Violence, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 407, 413 (1959).
5. See J. ELY, supra note 3; Bork, supra note 3.
6. See Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Post-
script to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881 (1970).
7. See Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARv. L. REv. 681 (1981).
8. See Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guar-
antee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984).
9. Note, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Re-
view, 54 U. CHL L, REV. 208, 209 (1987).
10. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 78 (1988).
11. 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (restricting federal prosecutions of mail fraud to cases in-
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ing federal prosecutions of corrupt state and local officials. 2
Historically, however, the guarantee clause has been a "dead
letter" or "sleeping giant."' 3 The quiescence of the clause may
be traced to the Supreme Court's response to a crisis in the
1840s popularly known as Dorr's rebellion. 14 This paper exam-
ines the comments of John C. Calhoun on this crisis with a view
towards ascertaining how his reflections, although dated and in-
complete, might be relevant to contemporary discussions of the
guarantee clause. To reach this end, a basic understanding of
the issues posed by Dorr's rebellion is necessary.
I. HISTORICAL PROLOGUE: DORR's REBELLION
The seeds of Dorr's rebellion took root shortly after the
American Revolution. At that time, rather than following the ex-
ample of most other states that were drawing up new state con-
stitutions,'5 Rhode Islanders decided instead to adapt their
Charter of 1663, granted by Charles II, to the circumstances of
independence.' 6 In a fashion characteristic of the time it was
originally granted, 17 the Charter neither made formal provision
for its own amendment - as would a number of state constitu-
tions adopted during the Revolutionary War period 8 - nor did
it reflect more liberal notions of suffrage and representation that
would follow. Accordingly, it limited the franchise to freeholders
whose representatives, largely from rural enclaves, proved none
too eager to extend the right to others. By the 1840s the situa-
tion, as described by one modern scholar, caused concern among
defenders of majority rule:
Only four of ten adult white male citizens could vote, and those
who could not were also still excluded from the jury boxes and
12. See Kurland, supra note 3.
13. The latter phrase was coined by Charles Sumner in 1867. See W. WIECEK,
supra note 4, at 2.
14. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
15. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 127-32
(1969).
16. See G. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861, 13
(1976).
17. Cahn, An American Contribution, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 1-25
(E. Cahn ed. 1954).
18. See R. Traynor, The Amending System of the United States Constitution, an
Historical and Legal Analysis 43-64 (1927) (thesis on file at Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley).
1989]
3
Vile: John C. Calhoun on the Guarantee Clause
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts of the state. Freemen in Providence, a city of 21,870
people, constituted a mere 6 percent of the city's population,
while in the tiny southern village of Jamestown they counted
16 percent. 0
A Supreme Court Justice described Rhode Island's freeholder
requirement by noting:
By the growth of the State in commerce and manufactures,
this requirement had for some time been obnoxious; as it ex-
cluded so many adult males of personal worth and possessed of
intelligence and wealth, though not of land, and as it made the
ancient apportionment of the number of representatives,
founded on real estate, very disproportionate to the present
population and personal property in different portions and
towns of the State.
20
In a period during which a number of prominent states re-
vised their constitutions,21 the fact that Rhode Island was faced
with a rising public clamor for reform is unsurprising. Because
the malapportioned legislature rebuffed several reform efforts
during the 1830s, a group of citizens, known as the suffragists,
eventually took matters into their own hands. In August 1841
the suffragists held elections for delegates to a constitutional
convention. Later that year the convention drafted a more lib-
eral state constitution and submitted it for approval to all the
state citizens, regardless of their status as freeholders. This
newly constituted electorate2 2 voted overwhelmingly in favor of
the new People's Constitution. "Nearly 14,000 Rhode Islanders
marked affirmative ballots, while only 52 opposed and 9,146 ab-
stained. Based on accepted census tabulations, the Suffragists
won an absolute majority of 2,372 out of a potential 23,142
votes. It is significant that a majority of the freemen approved
19, G. DENNISON, supra note 16, at 27. Much of the description of the Dorr rebel-
lion in this article is drawn from Dennison and from the decision in Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For other useful surveys, see Conron, Law, Politics, and Chief
Justice Taney: A Reconsideration of the Luther v. Borden Decision, 11 Am. J. OF LEGAL
HIST. 377 (1967); Schuchman, The Political Background of the Political-Question Doc-
trine: The Judges and the Dorr War, 16 Am. J. OF LEGAL HIST. Ill (1972).
20. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 48 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
21. See DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS OF THE 1820s (M. Peterson ed. 1966).
22. See G. DENNISON, supra note 16, at 49. The election was held from December
27, 1841, to January 1, 1942.
[Vol. 40
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the new instrument of government."2 Elections subsequently
were held under authority of the new constitution, and Thomas
Dorr was elected governor.
Unfortunately for Dorr and his supporters, the Charter gov-
ernment refused to recognize Dorr's election or the constitution
under which he had been elected. Nevertheless, because the
Charter government felt pressured by the suffragists, it held its
own freeholder's convention in November 1841. Although the
constitution drafted by the Charter government was roughly
comparable in its democratic sentiments to that drafted by the
suffragists, it was narrowly defeated in a March 1842 referen-
dum. The freeholder's convention, however, did serve as a prel-
ude to yet another convention that would report out a document
far more liberal than the Charter. That constitution was ratified
in November 1842.24 By the time the Dorr controversy reached
the courts, both sides had accepted this new constitution as
legitimate.
In the meantime, the General Assembly of the Charter gov-
ernment refused to accept the legitimacy of the Dorr govern-
ment and eventually declared the statewide existence of martial
law. The Charter government also successfully resisted Dorr's
somewhat pathetic attempts to capture the state arsenal and
otherwise assert his control of the state. While President Tyler
prudently resisted calls to suppress the rebellion with federal
troops, his statement of support for the Charter government
early in the crisis generally is recognized as having an important
role in undermining the legitimacy of the Dorr cause and assur-
ing its collapse. 25 Dorr, who initially fled the state, soon returned
and accepted imprisonment 26 so that he could seek vindication
in the courts for the cause that he seemingly had won at the
ballot box, but lost in the legislature of the Charter Government
and on the battlefield.
23. Id. at 53.
24. See id. at 98.
25. Chief Justice Taney thus noted that "it is admitted in the argument, that it
was the knowledge of this decision that put an end to the armed opposition to the char-
ter government, and prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed
constitution." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 44 (1849).
26. See G. DENNISON, supra note 16 at 107-08. Dorr's sentence ultimately was com-
muted after he spent a year in jail.
1989]
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II. Luther v. Borden: THE JUDICIARY AND DORR'S REBELLION
Ironically, the most prominent case involving Dorr's Rebel-
lion was not Dorr's own. Instead, it was Luther v. Borden,s7 a
case that percolated in the lower courts for years before finally
being resolved by the Supreme Court in 1849. At issue was an
action for trespass brought by Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter,
against Luther Borden, a militiaman for the Charter govern-
ment, for actions Borden had taken under authority of the Char-
ter government's martial law proclamation. Borden had entered
Luther's home and conducted a search for Luther. He found no
one there because Luther had fled across the state border. Upon
his return, however, Luther demanded payment of damages, ar-
guing that the search had been illegal because the Charter gov-
ernment was not the legitimate republican government of Rhode
Island and, therefore, could not authorize such a search. In es-
sence, Luther asked the Court to side retrospectively with the
arguably more democratic, albeit legally unrecognized, govern-
ment that he had supported.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument. Chief Justice
Taney, who regarded the question arising from "the unfortunate
political differences" in Rhode Island to be both a "new ques-
tion" and "a very grave one, wrote the opinion for the Court.
Taney noted that a decision favorable to Luther would have po-
tentially widespread consequences:
For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as
proposed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the
charter government had no legal existence during the period of
time above mentioned,-if it had been annulled by the adop-
tion of the opposing government,-then the laws passed by its
legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully
collected; its salaries and compensation to its officers illegally
paid; its public accounts improperly settled; and the judgments
and sentences of its courts in civil and criminal cases null and
void, and the officers who carried their decisions into operation
answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.29
In previous cases, Taney noted, claims about the legitimacy of a
27. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
28. Id. at 34-35.
29. Id. at 38-39.
[Vol. 40
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state government had been entrusted to the "political depart-
ment" of government.3 0 He reasoned that courts act under con-
stitutions and laws, not above them. Furthermore, according to
Taney, a court that found the government under which it acted
to be illegitimate would, by reason of its very decision, "cease to
be a court."3' On matters of state law, Taney further stated, the
decisions of Rhode Island's courts, which had continued to rec-
ognize the Charter government, must be respected. Therefore,
he concluded, it would be difficult to imagine how courts, on
their own, could establish which voters were qualified and which
government truly was supported by the people.2
To the extent that the Constitution addressed this situa-
tion, Taney argued that it entrusted decisions about the republi-
can character of a state government to Congress when that body
decided whether to seat congressmen. Moreover, in addressing
situations of domestic violence, Congress in 1795 had enacted
legislation that entrusted certain powers to the President.3 '
While such powers, like any others, conceivably could be abused,
they would be checked - at least in part - by the visibility and
responsibility of the presidential office.35 Taney concluded that
the President's earlier recognition of the Charter government
must be respected and that the General Assembly's declaration
of martial law was appropriate to the occasion. 6
Taney therefore decided that the plaintiff's argument, based
"upon political rights and political questions, ' s was inappropri-
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id. at 40-41.
32. See id. at 42.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 43. This act provided:
[I]n case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the
legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be
convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States,
as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.
Id.
Taney specifically linked this legislation, not to article IV, § 4, but to the domestic vio-
lence clause, which provides that Congress may "provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
35. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44.
36. See id. at 45-47.
37. Id. at 46.
1989]
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ate for judicial resolution. While no one "has ever doubted the
proposition, that . . . the sovereignty in every State resides in
the people of the State, and that they may alter and change
their form of government at their own pleasure," Taney con-
cluded that "whether they have changed it or not by abolishing
an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a
question to be settled by the political power."3
Interestingly, Justice Woodbury's dissenting opinion fo-
cused on the legality of Rhode Island's declaration of martial
law rather than on the other substantive issues. Indeed, Wood-
bury, who had as a senator from New Hampshire indicated sup-
port for the Dorr government,"9 emphasized the political-ques-
tion doctrine even more than had Taney. Not surprisingly,
Woodbury's opinion reflects greater sensitivity to Dorr's claim:
"It is not probable that the active leaders, and much less the
masses, who were engaged on either side, had any intention to
commit crimes or oppress illegally their fellow-citizens." '40 He
also seemed to commend revolution in those instances in which
the political processes are blocked.4
Woodbury's stance on the political question doctrine, how-
ever, was quite similar to Taney's. In Woodbury's scheme, as in
Taney's, the judiciary should act under a constitution but not
above it. "Our power begins," he wrote, "after theirs ends. Con-
stitutions and laws precede the judiciary, and we act only under
and after them, and as to disputed rights beneath them, rather
than disputed points in making them."42 Woodbury believed
that the judiciary is not a check on "the people themselves" but
38. Id. at 47.
39. See G. DENNISON, supra note 16, at 129.
40. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 50 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 55. Woodbury thus noted:
If it be asked what redress have the people, if wronged in these matters, unless
by resorting to the judiciary, the answer is, they have the same as in all other
political matters. In those, they go to the ballot-boxes, to the legislature or
executive, for the redress of such grievances as are within the jurisdiction of
each, and, for such as are not, to conventions and amendments of constitu-
tions. And when the former fail, and these last are forbidden by statutes, all
that is left in extreme cases, where the suffering is intolerable and the prospect
is good of relief by action of the people without the forms of law, is to do as did
Hampden and Washington, and venture action without those forms, and abide
the consequences.
42. Id. at 52.
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rather on their legislature or their executive. 43 He also noted
that questions involving the validity of a given constitution were
political: "They are too near all the great fundamental principles
in government, and are too momentous, ever to have been in-
trusted by our jealous fathers to a body of men like judges, hold-
ing office for life, independent in salary, and not elected by the
people themselves."44 Faced with oppression, the people must
resort to the ballot boxes or, when this fails, to revolution.
45 Suc-
cess, he concluded, will depend in such circumstances not on ju-
dicial judgments but on the force of arms and the moderation of
responding governments.
The Luther opinion, coming six years after the Dorr Rebel-
lion, recognized that whatever rights or wrongs had been in-
volved, little could be gained and possible chaos could be reaped
by giving ex post facto recognition to a government that, even in
the eyes of its supporters, had never been able to assert its own
authority. The pragmatism of the result makes it difficult to
fault the decision in that respect.
The Court's summary treatment of the guarantee clause,
however, is more troublesome. First, the Court read the clause as
giving solely to Congress and the President a power seemingly
entrusted to all three branches. 46 Moreover, by construing the
guarantee clause as a nonjusticiable provision, the Court argua-
bly allowed states to sanction a series of individual procedures
that had the ultimate effect of transforming a genuinely republi-
can government into one that was not. The only relief available
in such cases would come from either the Congress, who could
refuse to seat a state delegation, or the President, who could
deal with the recalictrant state by force.47 Neither method of re-
lief, however, was tailored to individual grievances.
Moreover, the Court's decision, if it is the only lens through
which one views the Dorr controversy, may obscure the wider
implications of the rebellion. The apparent conflict between nu-
merical majorities and constituted authority generated intense
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 54.
45. See id. at 55.
46. See Merritt, supra note 10, at 75.
47. By also focusing chiefly on presidential responses, Calhoun's position is subject,
in part, to this same criticism. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
1989]
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political debate that extended well beyond the confines of Rhode
Island. Partisans on both sides met with President Tyler before
he declared his support for the Charter government. Congress
also showed a keen interest in the Rhode Island controversy.
The congressional debate was largely a partisan squabble with
one committee, composed of a majority of Democrats, issuing a
report highly critical of Tyler's actions.48 There were additional
attempts to introduce the controversy at the Democratic Con-
ventions of 1844 and 1848.49
III. CALHOUN AND THE RHODE ISLAND CONTROVERSY
Because of the intense political debate over Dorr's rebellion,
the controversy generated much commentary long before the Su-
preme Court's decision in Luther v. Borden. The most compre-
hensive treatment perhaps resulted from an exchange of letters
between William Smith ard Senator John C. Calhoun. Smith
was a Rhode Islander and a moderate supporter of the Dorr gov-
ernment;50 Calhoun was a prominent South Carolinian and a po-
tential presidential candidate in 1844. Smith propounded six
questions regarding the rebellion to Calhoun, who responded in
a letter dated July 3, 1843.1 Calhoun's letter reflected several
weeks of thought and composition52 and is considered to be "one
of his principal political essays."53
Although references to Madison, Jefferson, Marshall, Web-
ster, or Lincoln are not unusual in contemporary constitutional
discourse, mention of Calhoun is found less often. This is largely
because Calhoun epitomized those who defended slavery, not
simply as a necessary evil to be tolerated, but rather as a posi-
48. See G. DENNISON, supra note 16, at 134-46.
49. See id. at 137. Significantly, Dennison cites Calhoun as one who was instru-
mental in keeping the issue from reaching the convention floor. Id.
50. See id. at 77.
51. Letter from John C. Calhoun to William Smith (July 3, 1843) [hereinafter
Smith Letter], reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 270 (C. Wilson ed. 1986)
(hereinafter PAPERS].
52. Thus, Calhoun wrote that "I have made my answer full; in fact covered the
whole ground, and in a great measure exhausted the subject." Letter from John C. Cal-
houn to Robert M. T. Hunter (Aug. 6, 1843), reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at
335.
53. See W. WIECEK, supra note 4, at 134.
[Vol. 40
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tive good to be furthered. 4 Moreover, Calhoun is almost inextri-
cably linked to the now-discredited notion of nullification and
its handmaiden, secession.55
Despite these negative associations, Calhoun, who served as
a United States Representative, Senator, Vice President, and
Secretary of State, easily takes his place among the most promi-
nent of American statesmen in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Though Calhoun was born too late to be considered one
of America's founding fathers, his constitutional reasoning is
still respected for its depth and logical clarity. His Disquisition
on Government56 generally is regarded as one of the most impor-
tant American contributions to political theory, and his Dis-
course on the Government and Constitution of the United
States57 is among the most comprehensive treatments of the
subject written in America's first century. In a manner charac-
teristic of his better-known works, Calhoun's letter to Smith rec-
ognized the issues surrounding Dorr's rebellion as more than
mere partisan controversies and attempted to place them in a
broader theoretical and constitutional context.
Smith's first question asked whether each state possessed a
republican form of government when it ratified the Constitution.
Calhoun's affirmative reply was based on twin assumptions: (1)
the Union would not have accepted a state that was not republi-
can and (2) a state would not have entered the Union with the
understanding that its own government would be suppressed.
To suppose ... that any State whose government was not re-
publican, within the meaning of the guarantee, would ratify the
Constitution and enter the Union, and that the other States
would accept the ratification and admit her, is too absurd for
belief. It would be to suppose, that the State, so ratifying, stip-
ulated for the suppression of the very government under which
it entered the Union .... It would also be to suppose, that the
other States, in ... admitting her into the Union, permitted
54. See J. C. CALHOUN, A Disquisition on Government, in 1 WORKS OF JOHN C.
CALHOUN 1 (R. Cral1 ed. 1851) [hereinafter Disquisition].
55. See J. C. CALHOUN, The South Carolina Exposition, in 10 PAPERS, supra note
51, at 442 (containing both Calhoun's original draft and a subsequent revision).
56. See Disquisition, supra note 54.
57. See J. C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
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that to be done, which was directly opposed to the guarantee
58
Calhoun's answer thus suggested that no infirmity that existed
in any of the original thirteen states could be challenged as a
violation of the guarantee clause.
The second question posed to Calhoun was whether the
President, before rendering aid in a case of domestic violence
within a state, should pause to consider whether the state gov-
ernment was republican. This time Calhoun's affirmative an-
swer, in which he acknowledged such a "high and delicate right,"
was more qualified. He attempted to place the guarantee clause
in the larger context of the "guarantee section" of which it is a
part."9
Calhoun identified three separate guarantees in article IV,
section 4 of the Constitution: "that of a republican form of gov-
ernment, to every State of the Union, that of protection to each
against invasion, and that against domestic violence, on the ap-
plication of the Legislature, or the Executive, when the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened." 60 Calhoun further tied these three
clauses to three objects listed in the preamble to the Constitu-
tion: "'to insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity.' ,8' These three clauses sought separately to guar-
antee "the peace, safety and liberty of the States."62 The guar-
antee against domestic violence protected states from attacks
from within; the provision against invasion protected states from
from external attacks; finally, the guarantee of a republican gov-
ernment protected states "from the ambition and usurpation of
. . . governments, or . . . rulers.
'6 3
58. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 270-71.
59. See id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 271.
60. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 271-72.
61. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 272 (quoting U.S. CONST.
preamble).
62. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 272.
63. Id. Calhoun thereby deduced the meaning of the guarantee clause by a process
that Charles Black has called "structure and relation." See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). One difficulty with this approach is ascer-
taining which structures or relations to emphasize. For example, one contemporary com-
mentator on the guarantee clause, who cites Black for authority, focuses not on the rela-
tion of the guarantee clause to the provisions against violence and invasion but on its
relation to the full faith and credit clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and, by
678 [Vol. 40
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The provision against domestic violence, Calhoun argued,
was a protection for state governments. Accordingly, this is the
only one of the provisions in which action must be initiated by
the state government itself, either by application of the legisla-
ture or, when it is not in session, the executive. The provision
against invasion, designed to protect the states as a whole, is
part of the Union's responsibility in preserving its sovereignty.
This led to Calhoun's interpretation of the guarantee clause.
"[I]ts object," Calhoun wrote, "is the reverse of that of protec-
tion against domestic violence. . . . [I]nstead of being intended
to protect the Governments of the States, it is intended to pro-
tect each State . . . against its Government; or, more strictly,
against the ambition or usurpation of its rulers. '6 4 Designed to
protect states against rulers' attempts "to change the forms of
their governments, and to destroy their liberty," 5 this provision
did not require application by a state government to be effec-
tual. Indeed, "it would be a perfect absurdity to require, that the
party, against which the guarantee is intended to protect, should
make application to be protected against itself."66
Calhoun believed the federal right to intervene against the
state's rulers to be "a high and delicate one; the highest and
most delicate of any conferred on the Federal government: and
. . . the most dangerous, if. . . not. . . subject to such restric-
tions, as left but little discretion in its exercise. ' '16 Calhoun's re-
analogy, to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, supra note
8, at 568-69.
64. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 274 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Interestingly, Calhoun's argument is on this point is close to Kurland's. See Kur-
land, supra note 3, at _. Kurland believes that:
[t]he clause exists not as a procedural guarantee to the institutions of state
government, but rather, as a collective substantive guarantee to the people of
each state, including the people of each political community within each state,
of protection from the erosion of republican principles of government at all
levels of government.
Id. The distinction between the two lies in the entity protected. Calhoun focused on the
state. Kurland focuses on the people.
65. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERs, supra note 51, at 274. Calhoun thus dis-
tinguished between two meanings of "state" in the separate clauses of article IV, § 4.
This interpretation seems preferable to one that requires that they be the same. For an
attempt to follow this latter path, see Ferguson, supra note 4, at 411.
66. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 275.
67. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 276.
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strictions may be divided into three parts.68 First, he argued that
the federal government "has no right, whatever, in any case, to
look beyond [a state's] admission into the Union," since such
admission was acknowledgment of the state's republican charac-
ter. 9 Second, Calhoun believed that no changes, apart from
those that "alter [a state government's] form, or make it differ-
ent in some essential particular, from those of the other States,
at the time of their adoption," would qualify for federal atten-
tion.70 Calhoun reiterated this belief in his third restriction:
"[T]he forms of the governments of the several States, compos-
ing the Union, as they stood at the time of their admission, are
the proper standard, by which to determine whether any after
change, in any of them, makes its form of government other
than republican. ' 71 Taken together, these restrictions not only
would leave the federal government little discretion, but they
also would protect slavery, the South's peculiar institution, as
well as states with restrictions on suffrage.72 Indeed, Calhoun ob-
viously had formulated his guidelines in the knowledge that
under more abstract standards, "[t]he Governments of one half
of the States of the Union would not stand the test, which would
be adopted by a large portion of the other half.
'73
Calhoun's analysis urged caution even when intervention by
the federal government might be warranted. Temporary usurpa-
tions of state government normally would be dealt with by resort
to the ballot box at the state level itself. Only if state leaders
used force to usurp power, "and not before," would federal in-
tervention be appropriate to suppress the usurpation.74
Of course, the state citizens themselves might initiate
changes in their constitution that would alter the state govern-
ment's fundamental character. Calhoun saw no remedy for these
changes and argued that liberty "cannot be forced on a people"
but "must be voluntarily embraced. '75 Thus, a voluntary change
68. See W. WIECEK, supra note 4, at 134-35. I have used Wiecek's outline, although
the second and third points he identifies are quite similar.
69. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS supra note 51, at 277.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Discourse, supra note 57, at 333.
73. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 278.
74. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 277.
75. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 275.
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in the form of state government would constitute "a clear case of
secession," although Calhoun did caution that any doubt about
whether the state remained republican should be resolved in
favor of maintaining the state within the Union. 6
Having conceded that the President has limited authority to
inquire into the republican character of a state government re-
questing federal aid to quell rebellion, Calhoun proceeded to ad-
dress Smith's third question. Smith asked whether "the numeri-
cal majority of the people" of a state in the Union has "the right
to alter or abolish the Constitution, regardless of the mode pre-
scribed for its amendment, if any; and where there is none, of
the refusal or assent of such State?""7 Consistent with his dis-
trust of numerical majorities in the Disquisition,7 8 Calhoun re-
sponded in the negative, drawing a clear line between the right
of revolution and the right to bring about change by constitu-
tional means.
If a right existed for the numerical majority to change the
government, he stated, it needed to be either a natural right or a
political right.7" Natural rights either precede the political state
or are reclaimed by individuals "only where government has
failed in the great objects for which it was ordained, the security
and happiness of the people; and then only where no other rem-
edy can be applied." 80 In a functioning political state, however,
natural rights become "political rights, . . . that is, rights de-
rived from agreement or compact, express or implied."'" At the
national level and in all but two states, drafters of the various
constitutions had established procedures to amend those consti-
tutions. These specifications, Calhoun argued, proceeded not
76. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 278.
77. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 278-79.
78. See Disquisition, supra note 54, at 19-31. (distinguishing between a numerical
and a concurrent majority).
79. John Whipple, who with Daniel Webster defended Borden before the Supreme
Court, made a similar argument in that case, distinguishing natural, civil, and political
rights and classifying political rights, such as the right to vote, as "matters of practical
utility." See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 28 (1849). Since Calhoun's letter to
Smith was a public 'document, it may well have influenced Whipple in making his
argument.
80. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 282. Calhoun thus rec-
ognized the right of revolution as a moral right rather than as a legal right. See A. SPAIN,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 118 (1951).
81. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 279.
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from doubts about government's power to propose amendments
but from a desire to restrain the amending process."2 Thus,
amendments must proceed either according to specified forms
or, when they are lacking, with the government's approval.
Paradoxically, Calhoun argued that the people possess "the
power to make, alter or abolish constitutions," but governments
possess all other powers, including "that of proposing amend-
ments to their Constitutions, and calling conventions of the peo-
ple, for the purpose of amending, or proposing amendments, to
be ratified by the people. '83 Allowing the general government to
accept the right of a simple numerical majority to change a
state's constitution on its whim would lead to anarchy.
In answering the fourth question propounded to him, Cal-
houn stated that if he were elected President, he would protect a
state against a numerical majority seeking changes through
other than constitutional means.84 Moreover, consistent with his
earlier argument, Calhoun answered a fifth question by asserting
that the state citizens who abolished their republican form of
government "constitutionally and legally" would forfeit their
place in the Union.85 Finally, Calhoun answered Smith's sixth
question by reaffirming his own support of expanded state suf-
frage. He, nonetheless, made clear that he regarded that matter
and the proper composition of the government of Rhode Island
as "strictly domestic questions."'
IV. CALHOUN AND THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE
Pointing to Calhoun's undoubted desire to protect slavery,
the chief commentator on the guarantee clause has called Cal-
houn's reasoning in the letter to Smith "narrowly syllogistic.
8 7
This criticism is too harsh. The greatest strength of Calhoun's
position may be its syllogistic quality, as well as its clear distinc-
tion between constitutional change and revolutionary change
and its close attention to the actual wording of article IV, sec-
82. See id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 281-82.
83. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 281.
84. See id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 286-87.
85. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 287.
86. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 288.
87. See W. WIECEK, supra note 4, at 136.
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tion 4.
The version of the guarantee clause accepted by the Consti-
tutional Convention on June 11, 1787, simply stated that "a re-
publican constitution, and its existing laws ought to be guaran-
teed to each state by the United States."88 On July 18 of that
year this provision was changed into wording that is substan-
tially like that in the Constitution today: "That a Republican
form of Governmt. shall be guaranteed to each State & that each
State shall be protected agst. foreign & domestic violence."8 "
This alteration was important. It more clearly enabled states,
using procedures similar to those of the national government, to
make changes in their constitutions and laws as defects arose or
as circumstances otherwise warranted.90 This change also cre-
ated an ambiguity about whether the additional provisions
against domestic violence and invasion were amplifications of
the guarantee clause or additional and separable guarantees with
interrelated aims. Some writers treat section 4 as a whole.91
Others begin by noting that the provisions are separable, but
proceed to discuss them together.9 2 Others treat the clauses sep-
arately93 or ambiguously.
9 4
Calhoun, however, consistently argued that the second two
clauses were additional guarantees and not mere amplifications
of the first. He believed that the President could act to guaran-
tee a republican government even when not requested to do so
by a state governor.9 5 Calhoun based his arguments on two
88. Id. at 54.
89. Id. at 58.
90. See id. at 76.
91. See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
677-78 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak rev. ed. 1987) (3d ed. 1833).
92. See, e.g., W. WIECEK, supra note 4.
93. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 3.
94. See W. WIECEK, supra note 4, at 63-67. Wiecek notes that The Federalist Pa-
pers reflected a split personality on this issue. Madison stressed the positive aspects of
republicanism, noting its guarantee of majority rule in a representative system. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison). Hamilton emphasized the negative, noting how the
guarantee section would prevent domestic insurrections and the establishment of monar-
chies. See THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (A.Hamilton). This differing treatment simply may
reflect such ambiguity.
95. Calhoun's response to Smith's second question arguably blurred the distinction
between the first clause in article IV, section 4 and the other two by indicating that the
President must determine whether an existing government is republican before ex-
tending aid against domestic insurrections. This concession shows the limits of Calhoun's
1989]
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points: (1) the distinct goals the clauses seek to secure, which he
tied to the Preamble and (2) the differing modes of application
required to trigger protection of each provision. According to
Calhoun, the federal government needed a request from the
state government to act under the provision guaranteeing pro-
tection against domestic violence; the other guarantees empow-
ered the federal government to act unilaterally.
Calhoun believed that the guarantee clause guaranteed "lib-
erty." Although such a claim might not sufficiently narrow the
concept, it appears compatible with most of the major modern
interpretations of the clause.96 This interpretation also sets the
provision apart from the other clauses in article IV, section 4,
both of which were concerned with a state government's physical
security. 7
Calhoun's views, of course, were restricted by three provisos
that surely would not prove convincing to those scholars who ac-
cept the notion that constitutional provisions - especially those
that are phrased in general terms similar to the guarantee
clause9" - may grow beyond the intentions of those who formu-
lated them. To the extent that the founders' intentions are still
regarded as one important element of constitutional interpreta-
tion, however, and to the extent that Calhoun's strictures clarify
the limits on the guarantee clause accepted by the framers, these
provisos are of continuing usefulness in restricting interpreta-
tions that would depart too far afield from the founders' inten-
tions. Moreover, they reinforce the point that the guarantee
clause makes little sense in the first place, apart from some state
autonomy.100
Ironically, one of the greatest obstacles to adoption of Cal-
houn's views of the guarantee clause today is the structure of
approach. For additional insights into whether article IV, § 4 consists of one clause or
three, see Ferguson, supra note 4, at 412-14.
96. But see Note, supra note 9. (arguing that the clause might be used to give
stricter scrutiny to state regulation).
97. See U.S. CONsT., art. IV, § 4.
98. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 134-36 (1977).
99. See W. WIECEK, supra note 4, at 242. For further thoughts on the strengths and
limits of the doctrine of "original intent," see Fisher, Methods of Constitutional Inter-
pretation: The Limits of Original Intent, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 43 (1987). See also Bonfield,
The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude,
46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 559-60 (1962)
100. See Merritt, supra note 10 at 3, 25.
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state sovereignty upon which he based his comments. Specifi-
cally, his argument that a state whose people voluntarily re-
nounced a republican form of government had seceded would
hardly be acceptable in the aftermath of the Civil War or Chief
Justice Chase's generally accepted dictum that the Constitution
"looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States." 101 There is reason to argue, however, that in addition to
modifications such as the fourteenth amendment, which have al-
tered the federal system since the time Calhoun was writing,
Calhoun's own arguments on this point were not completely
consistent.
Because Calhoun argued that the guarantee clause was
designed to protect the people's liberty, he raised at least two
objections to regarding the people themselves, as opposed to
their rulers, as a threat against which the guarantee clause was
designed to guard. First, he believed that, as parties to the guar-
antee, "it would be absurd to suppose that [the states] under-
took to enter into a guarantee against themselves.' 12
The weakness of Calhoun's analysis here is that it ignores
the observation of John Marshall and his Federalist colleagues
that the Constitution had been ratified, not by state legislatures,
but by the people themselves acting through special conventions
in each of the states. 0 3 Moreover, Calhoun's more general theory
of government does not compel consideration of such self-limita-
tion as an absurdity. Calhoun believed that a central purpose of
the Constitution was to place restraints on the numerical major-
ity. There is no reason why the people of a state or their current
government should not want to bind or limit a government of
tomorrow. In Calhoun's own language:
Constitutions stand to governments, as laws do to individuals.
As the object of laws is, to regulate and restrain the actions of
individuals, so as to prevent one from oppressing or doing vio-
lence to another, so, in like manner, that of constitutions is, to
regulate and restrain the actions of governments, so that those
who exercise its powers, shall not oppress or do violence to the
rest of the community. Without laws, there would be universal
anarchy and violence in the community; and, without constitu-
101. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
102. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 275.
103. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
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tions, unlimited despotism and oppression.104
Calhoun's second argument against viewing the guarantee
clause as a restraint on the people, as well as upon their gover-
nors, was more substantive. Referring to liberty, Calhoun
observed:
It must be voluntarily embraced. If the people do not choose to
embrace it, or continue it, after they have, it cannot be forced
on them. The very act of doing so, would destroy it; and divest
the State of its independence and sovereignty, and sink it into
a dependent province. 05
In making this objection, he anticipated the argument that the
guarantee clause may be an important guarantee of state inde-
pendence;106 in a federal system, there are necessary limits on
attempts to force a state to be free. Calhoun, however, pressed
this argument too far. His objection may be met both by the
exercise of sound discretion on the part of the federal govern-
ment in evoking the guarantee clause and.perhaps by the subtle,
Federalist distinction between the people and government of a
state.
Calhoun argued that action taken by the people of a state
"acting in their political character, as citizens, and according to
constitutional and legal forms," must be taken to be the actions
of a state itself.10 7 This phraseology itself may be significant in
that it appears to leave open the possibility of federal interven-
tion when state governments, or their officials, act illegally or
unconstitutionally. 08 Beyond that, however, Calhoun's own
strictures on the dangers of numerical majorities would indicate
that when state constitutional protections were not strong
enough or when temporary passions might sway the people, a
state government possibly could be changed peacefully from its
republican form, albeit against the more permanent interests
and wishes of its citizens. In such cases, federal intervention
104. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 284.
105. Id., reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 275. Today this concern remains
a major obstacle to wide expansion of the guarantee clause. One writer calls the clause "a
self.deactivating constitutional provision." See Note, supra note 7, at 689.
106. See Merritt, supra note 10, at 3, 25.
107. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 275.
108. Several modern commentators have made the same point about the guarantee
clause. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 3; Note, supra note 8.
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hardly would be inimical to the interests of the state's people.
Undoubtedly, Calhoun was reluctant to distinguish between
a state and its people for fear of encouraging chaos by justifying
aid to a numerical majority who refused to work through ex-
isting constitutional channels. By failing to recognize this dis-
tinction, however, Calhoun's analysis of state government col-
lapses into the paradox. In a state in which all means of
constitutional change are blocked effectively by existing law or
by a system of limited suffrage - both of which were factors in
the Rhode Island rebellion - the only solution is to urge people
to work through the very system that was blocking their
efforts.' 09
The paradox is worthy of attention because of its similarity
to that encountered in modern discussions of state legislative
apportionment. In Colegrove v. Green 10 Justice Frankfurther
took the position, which he traced to the decision in Luther v.
Borden, that such state legislative apportionment is a "political
question" falling under the guarantee clause. According to this
view, eventually repudiated by the Court's decision in Baker v.
Carr,"' legislative reapportionment is a matter for state govern-
ments to resolve. "In this situation," Frankfurter wrote, "as in
others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong [in the
courts]. Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electo-
rate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through
an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the
people's representatives.""12 For plaintiffs arguing that the
state's electoral system gave them ineffectual representation,
Frankfurter's advice to work through that system to elect repre-
sentatives sympathetic to their interests must have seemed
hollow.
The difficulty of Frankfurter's position arguably was reme-
died when the Supreme Court declared that relief was available
to citizens under the equal protection clause." 3 Application of
the guarantee clause to voluntary - that is, peaceful - state
109. For the circularity of this position, see Note, Political Rights as Political Ques-
tions: The Paradox of Luther v. Borden, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1131-34 (1987).
110. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
111. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
112. Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 228.
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renunciations of republican government and to forceful and
fraudulent governmental efforts to maintain power might serve
as a similar solution to the dilemma posed by Calhoun's
analysis.1 "
Calhoun argued that when faced with a petition from a
state for help, the federal government should either extend aid
under the domestic violence clause or refuse it under the guar-
antee clause because the government was not republican and,
therefore, no longer in the union. Calhoun was willing for the
federal government to act unilaterally against a state govern-
ment only if it had been violently taken over by usurpers. He
thus expressed confidence that the people could effect all neces-
sary changes at the state level through peaceful means rather
than by revolutionary violence.
This confidence leads into the most puzzling aspect of Cal-
houn's letter to William Smith. Near the end of this letter, Cal-
houn cited the founders' faith in the people's capacity for self-
government. This confidence, and their exclusion of violence and
revolution as legitimate means of effecting constitutional change,
led them to believe that "if reason be left free to combat error,
all the amendments which time and experience might show to be
necessary, would, in the end, be made; and that the system,
under their salutary influence, would go on indefinitely, purify-
ing and perfecting itself.'1 15 Calhoun added:
Thus thinking, the liberty of the press, the freedom of speech
and debate, the trial by jury, the privilege of Habeas Corpus,
and the right of the people peaceably to assemble together, and
petition for a redress of grievances, are all put under the sacred
guarantee of the Federal Constitution, and secured to the citi-
zen against the power both of the Federal and State Govern-
ments. Thus it is, that the same high power, which guarantees
protection to the Governments of the States against change or
subversion by physical force, guarantees, at the same time, to
the citizens protection against restrictions on the unlimited use
of these great moral agents for effecting such changes as reason
may show to be necessary. 1
16
Not only is this passage one of the most liberal in the writ-
114. See Kurland, supra note 3.
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ings of a man not generally known for his liberalism,11 but it
appears by Calhoun's own constitutional strictures, as well as by
contemporary standards of his day, to be untrue.118 While all the
guarantees listed were indeed provided under the federal Consti-
tution, during the time Calhoun wrote, they were not "secured
to the citizen[s] against the power both of the Federal and State
Governments. ''1 19 The privilege of habeas corpus was granted in
article I, section 9 against federal suspension;120 the other guar-
antees were found in the Bill of Rights, and the Supreme
Court's decision had authoritatively established in Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore'21 that those guarantees applied only to the
national government and not against the states.1 22 Moreover,
Calhoun's own analysis of the guarantee clause would appear to
exclude forcing such guarantees upon states that did not care to
have them.
23
117. But see R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 103-10
(1940).
118. Interestingly, one may note the strong parallels between Calhoun's position
here and modern process-based theories of judicial review. Contemporary proponents of
judicial review argue that the main function of the judiciary is to keep state and national
political processes open and functioning, leaving resolution of specific grievances to the
democratic process itself. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 3. The parallel would be more
complete if Calhoun had added the right to vote to his list of federal guarantees.
119. Smith Letter, reprinted in 17 PAPERS, supra note 51, at 290.
120. This clause provides that: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Its placement in article I, § 9, rather than in § 10,
suggests that the clause was intended to regulate congressional actions rather than state
actions.
121. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
122. The Supreme Court has never overruled Barron. The provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. This process is known as the doctrine of selective incorporation.
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopary clause); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule required for violations of fourth amend-
ment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927) (first amendment); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
266 (1897) (fifth amendment takings and just compensation clauses). For a thorough
discussion of the controversy surrounding the incorporation doctrine, see Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
123. Calhoun possibly was introducing these specific guarantees as hallmarks of a
republican government. The author however, can find no other evidence from Calhoun's
letter to William Smith, or elsewhere, indicating that this was his intention.
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One has difficulty in believing that Calhoun, as a lawyer and
statesman particularly concerned about federal relations, did not
know about Barron. Even more difficult to believe is that he
would defend his arguments for peaceful change against revolu-
tionary change with an untruth, particularly one that would be
so easily called into question. Whether intentional or not, Cal-
houn's plea for the exclusion of violence appeared to rest on the
notion that the guarantees most essential to the political
processes at both state and federal levels had been guaranteed
by the federal Constitution.
Given this premise, one well might be justified in believing
that whatever temporary deviations occur, ultimately the people
of each state will be able to adapt their laws and constitutions to
their needs without revolutionary violence or, except in unusual
circumstances, additional federal intervention. While the reap-
portionment cases decided under the fourteenth amendment
and the application of major provisions of the Bill of Rights to
the states may have done much to assure that this will be the
case, perhaps the guarantee clause may be used to assure that
state political processes are kept open and free of fraud and that
individual rights of expression and political participation are
usurped by neither force nor fraud. A similar argument has been
advanced compellingly in the most recent scholarly discussion of
the guarantee clause.124 If such an interpretation is accepted, oc-
casions like Dorr's rebellion, in which a President might be
called upon to use physical force or threaten to use it to protect
an exigent state government, should be rare.
V. CONCLUSION
What, then, can be said of Calhoun's contribution to an un-
derstanding of the guarantee clause? If one comes to Calhoun
looking for a prescription that will enable one to decide precisely
how the guarantee clause should be applied in the contemporary
setting, one is likely to be disappointed. American federalism
124. See Kurland, supra note 3. Kurland proposes legislation whereby "whoever
knowingly executes or attempts to execute any scheme or artifice to defraud or deprive
the citizenry of a State or locality of its right to honest, faithful and loyal government of
such State or locality, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned." Id. at 471. He convincingly
argues that while this provision would be subject to judicial review, the Court should
apply a "rational basis" test to the legislation and uphold it. See id. at 458-59.
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has changed drastically since Calhoun's day by developments
that include the ratification of the fourteenth amendment and
the more gradual judicial incorporation of most of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of that amend-
ment so that now they also apply to the states.125 Calhoun's ar-
gument, that the people of a state should be permitted to re-
nounce voluntarily the republican government, was inadequate
when made126 and even less acceptable in the aftermath of the
Civil War. Similarly, Calhoun's hope to limit the application of
the guarantee clause to governmental defects that did not char-
acterize any of the states when they were admitted to the Union
is unconvincing to those who believe that a clause phrased in
general terms may expand beyond the narrow intentions of
those who framed it.
127
The weaknesses of Calhoun's analysis, however, must not
obscure its strengths. His analysis is perhaps the most complete
exposition of the clause offered before Chief Justice Taney's
gloss in Luther v. Borden.128 Much more clearly than that deci-
sion, Calhoun's analysis separated the guarantee clause from the
two constitutional provisions that accompany it. Furthermore, as
with a more contemporary scholar's interpretations, 129 Calhoun's
view offers a salutary caution against adoption of extreme inter-
pretations which would forget that the Constitution is intended
for the people of the states to be able to make certain important
political decisions on their own. Calhoun's understanding that
the clause was a guarantee of liberty against state governors
that, unlike the accompanying domestic violence provisions,
does not predicate federal response upon the request by state
officials for help, 30 is an important clue to understanding its
meaning. So, too, Calhoun's stress on the need for people in a
republican government to work through recognized legal means
if minority rights are to be protected and good order preserved,
illumines the very essence of the concept of ordered liberty in
which human rights are translated into effective civil and politi-
125. See Bonfield, supra note 99.
126. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
128. 48 U.S. 1 (7 How.) (1849).
129. See Merritt, supra note 10.
130. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
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cal rights.
Calhoun's analysis unintentionally may have pointed to the
further truth that if citizens are to be constrained to seek change
through legal and nonviolent means, they need some assurance
that these existing procedures are fair and open and that discov-
ered defects in government will be subject to change." 1 Perhaps
the central weakness of Calhoun's position, as well as many
other expositions of the application of the guarantee clause to
Dorr's rebellion, was that the Rhode Island citizens who partici-
pated in that rebellion had no assurance that their voices would
be heard given the makeup of that state's political system. If
modern proponents of change at the state level can be given
such assurance, whether by the equal protection clause, the
guarantee clause, or by other constitutional mechanisms,'32 Cal-
houn's own plea for the exclusive recognition of groups using le-
gal means to attain their ends becomes much stronger.
131. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
132. See Kurland, supra note 3.
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